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Abstract 
The present study examines how the use of social network sites (SNS) increases the potential 
of experiencing psychological, reputational and physical vulnerability online. From our 
theoretical perspective, concerns over the use of social network sites and online vulnerability 
stem from the ease with which users can amass large and diverse sets of online social 
connections and the associated maintenance costs. To date most studies of online vulnerability 
have relied on self-report measures, rarely combining such information with user’s validated 
digital characteristics. Here, for a stratified sample of 177 UK-based Facebook users aged 13 
to 77, digitally derived network data, coded for content and subjected to structural analysis, 
were integrated with self-report measures of social network heterogeneity and user 
vulnerability. Findings indicated a positive association between Facebook network size and 
online vulnerability mediated by both social diversity and structural features of the network. In 
particular, network clustering and the number of non-person contacts were predictive of 
vulnerability. Our findings support the notion that connecting to large networks of online 
‘friends’ can lead to increasingly complex online socialising that is no longer controllable at a 
desirable level.  
Keywords: social networks; network cluster; social spheres; network diversity; online 
vulnerability; online risk. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Online Vulnerability and Social Network Sites 
In an increasingly connected world, online social network sites (SNS; boyd & Ellison, 2008) 
provide interactive platforms for the digitally enabled to develop and manage their social 
spheres online. Surpassing the predominantly text-based methods of early computer-mediated 
communication, these sites afford users the ability to share a vast array of information in 
multimedia-rich environments. For the millions of global users who regularly engage with 
these sites (Ofcom, 2014), it has been suggested that they provide an online equivalent to face-
to-face communication contexts (Underwood, Kerlin & Farrington-Flint, 2011), and in doing 
so carry the potential of delivering a range of social and psychological benefits (Burke & Kraut, 
2014; Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007; Valkenburg, Peter & Schouten, 2006). At the same 
time, an area of mounting academic interest is addressing the potential associated risks and 
vulnerabilities of using SNS to interact and communicate with our social connections (Debatin, 
Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Wilcox & Stephen, 2012).  
Online vulnerability is the capacity to experience detriments to psychological, 
reputational or physical wellbeing (Davidson & Martellozzo, 2012) due to risks encountered 
whilst engaging in online activities. Online risks can take on many forms (Hasebrink, Görzig, 
Haddon, Kalmus, & Livingstone, 2011) including threats to data privacy, online gossip and 
rumours, incidents of online harassment such as cyber stalking and exposure to inappropriate 
and unwanted content (boyd & Ellison, 2008). Recent and substantial increases in the 
prevalence of  such adverse online experiences (BBC News, 2015; Jones, Mitchell & 
Finkelhor, 2013) have been linked to detrimental consequences such as depression (Landoll, 
La Greca, Lai, Chan & Herge, 2015) and suicide (Hinduja and Patchin, 2010, Washington 
Post, 2013). 
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Studies which have sought to find associations between SNS use and online 
vulnerability have so far relied mostly on self-report measures (Binder, Howes & Smart, 
2012; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009;). Technological advances in data collection methods (Hogan, 
2008; Rieder, 2013) now render it possible for psychologists and other researchers in non-
technical disciplines to combine such information with a user’s actual digital characteristics. 
Recently, technology-derived online network data have been used to explore social support 
mechanisms (Brooks, Hogan, Ellison, Lampe & Vitak, 2014). The present study will look at 
how such data can provide an in-depth exploration of online vulnerability that goes beyond 
the readily available metrics of traditional psychological research. 
1.2 Online Vulnerability and Network Heterogeneity 
Online vulnerability on SNS has been a frequent source of debate in both the realms of 
academia (Staksrud, Olafsson & Livingstone, 2013; Wilcox & Steven, 2012) and the popular 
press (BBC News, 2015; New York Times, 2014). Increased SNS engagement has been seen 
to lead to increases in online social network size (Madden, Lenhart, Cortesi, Gasser, Duggan, 
Smith et al., 2013), raising concerns about the consequences of network diversity (Manago, 
Taylor & Greenfield, 2012) and about data privacy (Debatin et al., 2009). In the following, we 
will outline a set of processes that link both network size and diversity to vulnerability. 
SNS are typically comprised of a myriad of interconnected ego-networks (Hogan, 
2008). An ego-network is a personal network in which an individual, the ego, connects with 
other people (Arnaboldi, Guazzini & Passerella, 2013) via a process of online ‘friending’. This 
concept of ‘friending’ plays on the traditional associations conjured up by offline friendship, 
mutual trust, common interests and an investment of time (Thelwall, 2008), in order to 
encourage users to enter into a mutually agreeable digital ’friendship’. Research has suggested 
that many of the online ‘friends’ made by an ego follow an offline to online trajectory (Bryant, 
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Sanders-Jackson & Smallwood, 2006; Ellison et al, 2007). For the average user, SNS are an 
important means of maintaining pre-existing relationships (Ellison et al., 2007). This affords 
the ego validation and reassurance that the ‘friends’ viewing their data are known and trusted 
contacts. However, this alone may not necessarily be sufficient to guard against online 
vulnerability. 
According to Dunbar’s (1998) Social Brain Hypothesis our limited cognitive capacities 
and the maintenance demands exerted by social relationships impose evolutionary constraints 
on the size of social networks. As a result, an ego should be best equipped to maintain 
approximately 150 meaningful connections, i.e., contacts that have some direct relationship 
with ego and are characterised for the network owner by name, face, and individuating 
background information. Sociological studies have put the total number of people actively 
known to an individual, leaving aside meaningfulness, at less than 300 (McCarty, Killworth, 
Bernard, Johnsen, & Shelley, 2001). In the realms of SNS, however, networks regularly 
number in their hundreds and even thousands. Recent estimates suggest that the average adult 
Facebook network contains 338 ‘friends’ (Pew Research, 2014). Whilst large networks have 
been positively associated with social support and informational resources (Ellison et al., 2007), 
a potential consequence is that they can become progressively unmanageable. One reason is 
that with increased size the traffic, or flow of information, through a network is likely to 
increase. Some proportion of this traffic will be difficult to manage for the ego (consider, for 
example, inappropriate broadcasting) and this proportion will likewise increase with size. 
Another reason is that the network’s social diversity in itself becomes more difficult to manage 
because the ego connects to ‘friends’ from an increasing number of partially incompatible 
social spheres (Binder et al., 2012). 
Each individual is highly likely to belong to a number of different social spheres and 
these will show up in every egocentric network. From family to friends, classmates to work 
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colleagues, different contacts play different roles and occupy different facets within the ego’s 
social network. As such a social network often affords a complex structure containing multiple 
contextual social boundaries. In the offline world, these relationships are carefully managed by 
the ego enabling them to project desired and moderated representations of the self (Vitak, 2012). 
On SNS, however, these contextually diverse ‘friends’ are allowed to digitally mingle. The 
contextual boundaries of the heterogeneous social spheres in which they reside are collapsed, 
forming an increasingly homogenous online existence in the ego’s network (Binder et al., 2012; 
Davis & Jurgenson, 2014; Marwick & boyd, 2011). 
This digital mingling can lead to online vulnerability due to unintended collisions 
between heterogeneous social spheres. Binder and colleagues (2012), in a study on UK-based 
Facebook users, found that social diversity in a Facebook network resulted in increases in 
online tension over and above the effects of network size. This was attributed to the unrestricted 
flow of information across the collapsed contextual social boundaries. For example, a ‘friend’ 
of the ego posting information pertinent to the sphere in which they reside (e.g. a risqué ‘in’ 
joke) might inadvertently cause tension with ‘friends’ from contextually different spheres 
within the network.  
In a contextually collapsed network, however, it is not just the risk posed by the 
communications of the ego’s friends that can potentially increase vulnerability, but also the 
communications of the ego themselves. SNS impact on our ability to imagine the audience to 
which we are communicating (boyd, 2007; Litt, 2012). When we engage in communication 
with individuals or small groups (i.e. in face-to-face settings or via small scale technology-
mediated communications), the audience to whom we are communicating is unambiguous due 
to immediate visual and/or auditory validation (Litt, 2012). On social networking platforms, 
however, audiences have a tendency to become less explicit as the size, diversity and 
permanence of the networks increasingly decreases their salience (boyd, 2007). 
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When an ego posts a communication on an SNS, it is likely that their imagined audience 
does not consist of the complete social network but rather a subset derived from either 
technological cues (e.g. the ‘Online’ friend list, frequent likers/commenters) or cognitive 
references to offline social contexts (Marwick and boyd, 2011). For the ego, this potential to 
misjudge the prospective audience has implications for online vulnerability, due to an increased 
likelihood in the ego communicating content that is not appropriate for all of the heterogeneous 
social spheres contained on their network (Binder et al., 2012). On this basis, we expected first 
of all that network size and social heterogeneity would both be positively related to 
vulnerability: 
H1: Network size will positively predict exposure to online vulnerability. 
H2: Social network heterogeneity will positively predict exposure to online 
vulnerability. 
Heterogeneous spheres so far have been defined and measured as social diversity, the different 
types of contacts that can be identified in a network (Binder et al., 2012; McCarty et al., 2001). 
This leaves the question how these contacts are arranged and interconnected. SNS carry the 
unique advantage of digitally mapping out network structures, which allows for the 
identification and quantification of clusters (Smith, Schneiderman, Milic-Frayling, Mendes 
Rodrigues, Barash, Dunne et al., 2009). Clusters are discernible subgroups characterised by a 
high degree of internal interconnections and few external connections to other parts of the 
network. As such, they provide another indicator of different spheres managed by ego. Clusters 
may not fully coincide with the social categories listed for a network. For example, a category 
‘friends known from school’ may be located within one cluster representing the social 
environment of ego at school and another cluster representing an inner friendship circle that is 
distinct from the wider school context. In this study, we considered not only the diversity of 
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social contacts as identified by ego but also the actual heterogeneous clustering of ego’s online 
network. We thus hypothesise that: 
H3: Structural network heterogeneity will positively predict exposure to online 
vulnerability. 
In addition, we tested a more comprehensive model to integrate network size, heterogeneity 
and vulnerability. While previous research has shown that heterogeneity can have effects 
independent of size (Binder et al., 2012), findings also suggest that problematic online incidents 
may well be related to network size through an increase in heterogeneity (Manago et al., 2012). 
In other words, network size is a driver for developing those network characteristics that lead 
to higher levels of online vulnerability, and the size-vulnerability relationship is mediated by 
these characteristics. We therefore propose that: 
H4: Social and structural heterogeneity will mediate the relationship between network 
size and online vulnerability. 
1.3 Implications of non-standard online ‘friends’ 
Ego-centred sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn actively encourage people to provide a 
wealth of personal information to aid validation of user authenticity and guard against instances 
of fake profiles. While some studies have shown online presentations of the self to be are 
generally accurate (Back, Stopfer, Vazire, Gaddis, Schmukle, Egloff et al., 2010; YouYou, 
Kosinski, & Stilwell, 2015), it has been estimated that approximately 5 to 11 percent of 
Facebook profiles might be erroneous (Facebook, 2015). 
Safely navigating an online network may also be compromised by the presence of 
‘friends’ who are not characteristic of traditional online connections. Most SNS, and indeed 
most Internet services, do not recognise individuals, but user accounts. The assumption, 
however, that all user accounts represent true, individual people is not warranted. Accounts 
9 
 
 
 
may also include or omit information that is important for ego to reliably identify other contacts. 
Non-standard online contacts can therefore make it even more difficult for a user to form an 
impression of their actual audience. 
At present it is not possible to identify with great certainty profiles on a network that 
might offer negative consequences to the ego and their connections. However, digital ego 
network data offer some opportunities to identify characteristics indicative of ‘non-standard’ 
connections. Here, we are particularly concerned with misclassified profiles, use of obvious 
pseudonyms, missing information and socially isolated contacts. 
1.3.1 Misclassified profiles 
Misclassified profiles occur when the social network account holder creates a profile that does 
not match the general norms or expectations of a traditional profile. According to Facebook’s 
(2015) annual report to the US Securities Exchange Commission, approximately 2% of all 
monthly active profiles on Facebook are misclassified profiles. Whilst 2% may not at first 
appear substantial, in the context of Facebook which currently has approximately 1.39 billion 
monthly active users, this equates to an estimated of 27.8 million profiles. 
Misclassified profiles are entities that should be represented on an online social network 
by a ‘page’ or specific space and not by a personal profile. They are often representative of 
small companies, organisations, social interest groups and even pets. Misclassified profiles 
may occur due to user-error (i.e. the account holder is not familiar with the terms and conditions 
of the site) or potentially for malicious purposes (i.e. a person pretending to be a known 
company using a fake profile in order to gain data/and or money from unsuspecting users). 
1.3.2 Pseudonym use 
The use of a pseudonym is a form of identity concealment (Hogan, 2012). Full pseudonyms 
offer a completely non-representative name – often made up or indicative of a figure from 
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popular culture. Partial pseudonyms might use one of the individual’s real names in addition 
to a “made up” name, i.e. Super Sarah. A number of high profile SNS implement a ‘Real Name 
Policy’ for which they actively encourage the use of real names (Facebook2, 2015; LinkedIn, 
2015). The policy is indicative of a growing trend on online platforms toward non-anonymised 
communication (Hogan, 2012), driven in part by a desire to impinge on the growing problem 
of fake or erroneous profiles. Whilst the presence of pseudonym profiles on the network is not 
necessarily indicative of potential harm to the ego (Hogan, 2012) it has been suggested that 
such online anonymity may increase the likelihood of anti-normative behaviour being 
experienced (Cho, Kim & Acquisti, 2012).  
1.3.3 Inaccurate or missing data 
Inaccurate or missing data in profiles does not match the general norms or expectations of a 
standard social networking profile. As suggested by Herring and Martinson (2004), the non-
disclosure of personal attributes, such as gender, not only potentially impedes an ego’s ability 
to authenticate the identity of their prospective connection, but may also limit opportunities for 
them to moderate their communications in a manner appropriate to the norms and conventions 
associated with their prospective connections. 
1.3.4 Social Outliers 
Social outliers are individuals that are connected to the ego only. They are socially distant 
contacts who do not share any mutual friends with the ego and as such lack validation from 
other members of the ego network. Whilst some have theorised that such bridging or weak ties 
can provide the ego with diversified social and informational support (Burt, 2000), others have 
suggested that outliers may promote friction within the network as they have the fewer social 
and reputational costs (Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs, 1998). Interestingly, outliers may in time 
become more highly connected within the network. Boshmaf et al. (2011), for example, found 
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that SNS users were almost 50% more likely to accept a friend request if the connection had at 
least one mutual friend. 
The presence of non-standard network connections has the potential to further 
complicate the ego’s ability to effectively manage and moderate their online communications. 
While users view their close social spheres as points of reference for generating their target 
audience on social media (Marwick and boyd, 2011), sporadic cases of non-normative profiles 
are likely to be less salient. A potential consequence of this lack of salience is further social 
tension due to contextual collapse: from the perspective of both the ego and the non-standard 
profile holder. Additionally, ego’s vulnerability to malicious behaviours such as identity theft, 
data misuse and harassment is likely to increase due to the privacy implications of sharing data 
and communications with profiles that cannot be readily authenticated. In sum, we expected 
all non-standard connections identified to contribute to online vulnerability. Thus we 
hypothesised that: 
H5: The presence of Facebook profiles demonstrating non-norm characteristics will 
positively predict exposure to online vulnerability. 
Research has linked increases in network size and diversity to increases in superficial and 
unknown contacts (Manago et al., 2012). Assuming a small percentage of non-norm 
characteristics to be present in most active Facebook networks, it follows that the absolute 
frequency of such characteristics will increase with growing network size. Networks that run 
into hundreds, or thousands, of online contacts are no exception on Facebook and are likely to 
exhibit a non-negligible number of non-norm characteristics for mere probabilistic reasons. 
Furthermore, studies have also suggested that users holding larger networks may be more 
inclined to engage in “promiscuous friending activities” (Stefanone, Lackaff & Rosen, 2011; 
Stefanone, Lackaff & Rosen, 2008). From this perspective, the more the ego engages in these 
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activities, the less consideration the ego will give to a profiles actual validity or status, when 
adding online contacts. Therefore, we also expect that: 
H6: Frequency of non-norm network characteristics will mediate the relationship 
between network size, diversity and online vulnerability. 
2. Method 
An integrated data set was generated from cross-sectional survey measures and digitally 
derived network data to explore the relationship between Facebook network characteristics and 
online vulnerability.  
2.1 Sample 
Self-report survey data and digitally derived Facebook metrics were obtained from an 
opportunity sample of 177 UK based Facebook users (63% female). Participants were recruited 
from three UK-based populations stratified by age:  
(1) Secondary school aged children (N=50) between 13 and 17 years from three socio-
economically diverse UK schools. School and parental consent were obtained prior to 
the study. 
(2) Undergraduate students (N=63) from a large UK university. Participants responded to 
advertisements placed on student bulletin boards and also via a departmental participant 
pool. Research credits were awarded for participation in the study. 
(3) Online adult users (N=64) recruited via online advertisements. Permissions were gained 
from the administrators of the online message boards and communities prior to any 
advertisements being displayed.  
In return for their time, all participants were eligible for entry into a prize draw to win online 
vouchers. Appropriate ethical procedures were observed for all three sub samples. 
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2.2 Measures  
2.2.1 Self-reported measures 
Study-specific self-report measures were used to determine user and Facebook demographics, 
rate of exposure to online vulnerability and the number of different social ‘friend’ types 
connected to via Facebook.  
User Demographics. Items addressing age and gender (coded as 0 for male, 1 for female) 
were measured in order to provide a general overview of the sample characteristics. 
Facebook Demographics. Addressed by three items: duration of Facebook membership (in 
years); rate of daily Facebook engagement (up to 15/30/45/60 min; more than 60 min) and 
current Facebook privacy settings (e.g. “Friends Only”). 
Online vulnerability. Assessed using a six item scale adapted from questions and theory 
presented in Binder et al. (2012). Participants were asked to indicate how frequently they had 
been exposed to a range of online vulnerabilities (e.g. “critical or hurtful comments”, “social 
embarrassment”, “damaging gossip and rumours”, “content of sexual or violent nature”, 
“unwanted attention” and “data misuse”) whilst using Facebook. Responses to each item 
were positively anchored and ranged from 1 (Very Rarely) to 5 (Very Often). Items were 
averaged to form a reliable index (α=.93) with higher values indicating increased exposure to 
online vulnerability. 
Social ‘Friend’ Types: Sixteen friend types, listed in Table 3, were presented as dichotomous 
(Yes/No) items. The items were adapted from common network cluster categories previously 
attributed to ego-centric social network structures (Binder et al., 2012; McCarty et al., 2001). 
An overall tally of the number of different friend types was produced by summing up the 
number of positive responses to these items. Scores could therefore range from 0 to 16, with 
higher scores indicating increased heterogeneity of connections in the social network. 
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2.2.2 Digitally derived network characteristics 
Network characteristics were derived from data generated by Netvizz (Rieder, 2013), an 
application that enables individual Facebook users to access their mutual friendship data 
generated by the Facebook API (application programmer interface). Network data obtained this 
way include a unique identifier for each Facebook contact, the name of the Facebook contact 
and their gender. Further, all interconnections among ego’s contacts are listed. Facebook users 
who have set high privacy permissions are not captured by the application. For this reason 
Netvizz data can only provide an estimate of the actual structural properties of the user’s 
network. Network metrics were calculated using NodeXL, a network analysis tool developed 
by the Social Network Research Group (Hansen, Shneiderman & Smith, 2011). 
Network Size. An estimate of digitally derived network size was gained by summing the total 
number of network contacts listed in the Netvizz data. Network sizes for this sample ranged 
from 4 to 1468. 
Network Clustering. Clustering was calculated using the Clauset-Newman-Moore (2004) 
algorithm. A clustering coefficient was created for each individual node within the network. A 
global clustering coefficient was then produced for the entire network by averaging the 
individual coefficients. The global clustering coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. As exemplified in 
Figure 1, coefficients approaching 1 indicate closely knit networks with dense network 
structures with only a small number of social spheres present in the network. In contrast, 
coefficients closer to zero, as exemplified by Figure 2, are indicative of more heterogeneous 
network structures encapsulating multiple social spheres, isolated connections and instances of 
anomalous network contacts. 
Network Anomalies: profiles that are not characteristic of personal profile norms and/or 
patterns of connectivity evident in typical Facebook networks. Anomalies were measured by 
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four variables: gender-hidden profiles, misclassified profiles, pseudonym represented profiles 
and network outliers. Gender-hidden profiles were calculated using gender information for 
each network contact derived from the digital data. The number of network contacts with 
missing gender details was summed. This provided a total score of gender-hidden network 
contacts for each individual network. The total number of network outliers was generated using 
social network analysis to identify the number of network isolates in each individual network. 
To calculate the number of misclassified profiles and pseudonym represented profiles, 
a qualitative appraisal of the network contacts was made. All network contacts were inspected 
across the 177 networks (approximately 71,000) for instances of obvious pseudonyms (e.g. 
Mickey Mouse) and/or misclassified entities (e.g. companies, student groups) using a study-
specific set of anomaly indicators. This was done by one rater. A sample of 1,500 network 
contacts was then given to a second rater and ratings were compared. Where raters disagreed 
this was resolved without difficulty indicating good general understanding of the coding 
criteria. Further, Cohen's κ showed good inter-rater agreement (κ = .73 (95% CI, .67 to .80), p 
< .001). Instances of pseudonyms and misclassified entities were then summed up to provide 
an overall total for each network.  
2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed a secure online survey, optimised for use on desktop computers, tablets 
and mobile devices. On completion of the self-report survey participants were asked to obtain 
and send through their digitally derived network data. This part of the procedure was fully 
integrated with the survey. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Preliminary Analyses 
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General sample characteristics are displayed in Table 1. The mean age of the sample was 22 
years 10 months (SD = 9.82; Range: 13-77 years). The mean duration of Facebook membership 
was 5 years 5 months (SD = 2.04 years). Over half of all participants (54%) reported engaging 
with Facebook for 30 minutes or less per day. However, the majority of participants (72%) 
reported high rates of actual connectivity, indicating that whilst not actively engaging with 
Facebook they very rarely logged out of the network. The majority of participants (89%) 
reported using at least the standard “Friends Only” Facebook privacy settings, with 22% of 
these using more advanced additional filtering options. 
Descriptive statistics for the main measures are given in Table 2. Participants had on 
average experienced a moderate level of overall online vulnerability whilst using Facebook 
(M = 2.75, SD = 1.09, on a scale from 1 to 5). Network variables, given their scale, were not 
normally distributed, which was taken into account in subsequent analyses. Network size, for 
example, had a mean of M = 399.40 and a range of 4 – 1468 (SD = 277.25). The presence of 
a small number of large networks containing over 1000 friends led to a positive skew. 
A closer inspection of the types of friends listed (see Table 3) indicated that 
friends/class mates and family members were most frequent among network contacts. However, 
it should be noted that 62% of respondents named casual acquaintances, 28% online only 
contacts and 25% public figures among their contacts. 
 In order to control for the non-normal distribution of the network derived data 
Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients were calculated. These indicated the association 
between online vulnerability and the different measures of social network characteristics (see 
Table 4). The correlations amongst the main study variables did not suggest multi-collinearity 
with only one coefficient > |.07|. 
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As expected digitally derived network size moderately correlated with the measure of 
online vulnerability (rs = .38, p < .001), indicating that as network size increased online 
vulnerability scores also increased. Furthermore, as network size increased, the number of 
social friend types (rs = .43, p < .001) and the rate of clustering also increased (rs = -.51, p 
< .001), indicating increased level of both social and structural heterogeneity. Network size 
was also positively correlated with instances of anomalous network contacts. 
Online vulnerability moderately correlated with social friend types (rs = .37, p < .001) 
and network clustering (rs = -.26, p < .001), with scores in online vulnerability increasing as 
social and structural network heterogeneity increased. Correlations between online 
vulnerability and the anomalous network contacts were more mixed. Increases in misclassified 
profiles (rs = .39, p < .001), pseudonyms (rs = .20, p < .05) and network outliers (rs = .17, p 
< .05) were associated with increases in online vulnerability. No significant association was 
found between gender-hidden profiles and online vulnerability. All network anomalies were 
significantly correlated with both network clustering and social ‘friend’ types, with the only 
exception being the relationship between social ‘friend’ types and gender-hidden profiles (ns). 
3.2 Structural and Social Predictors of Online Vulnerability 
In order to test H1, H2 and H3, a set of bootstrapped hierarchical regression analyses were 
performed with online vulnerability as the dependent variable. Due to initial violations of 
normality and linearity, all variables were square root transformed prior to the analysis1. 
Following the transformation all assumptions of multiple regression were met. An overview of 
the regression analyses can be found in Table 5. 
 H1 stated that network size would be positively related to online vulnerability. In the 
first instance digitally derived Facebook network size was entered as the independent 
variable. Participant age and gender were controlled for. The overall regression model was 
18 
 
 
 
significant (F (3,176) = 12.43, p < .001), accounting for 17.7% of the variance of online 
vulnerability. In line with the initial correlational analysis, an increase in network size was 
predictive of increases in online vulnerability (b = .02, β = .34, p < .05) thus confirming H1. 
In addition, age was negatively related to vulnerability (b = -.05, β = -.13, p < .05). 
H2 and H3 stated that network heterogeneity would be positively related to online 
vulnerability. The regression model was therefore expanded to include social ‘friend’ types 
and network clustering as predictors of online vulnerability. Once again the overall model 
was significant (F (5, 176) = 10.73, p < .001), now accounting for 23.9% of the variance of 
online vulnerability. This represented a significant 6.2% change in the R2 value from the 
previous model (p = .001). 
Network clustering and reported social ‘friend’ types added statistically significantly to 
the predictive model (p < .05). The standardised beta coefficients indicated that increases in 
network diversity, as typified by increases in the number of social ‘friend’ types (b = 1.32, β 
= .18, p < .05) and decreases in the network clustering coefficient (b = -1.23, β =-.21, p < .05), 
are predictive of increases in network size. This means both H2 and H3 were supported. Again, 
age was a significant and negative predictor in the model (b = -.07, β = -.19 p < .05) suggesting 
that online vulnerability might be more apparent in the younger Facebook users amongst the 
sample. Introducing social groups (friend types) and network clustering to the model rendered 
the predictive value of network size insignificant. This was indicative of a potential mediating 
influence of these variables on the relationship between network size and online vulnerability, 
tested in detail further below. 
 The presence of network anomalies, as postulated by H5, should predict online 
vulnerability. To test this, the final regression model added number of misclassified profiles, 
gender-hidden profiles, pseudonym-represented profiles and network outliers to the predictors. 
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The addition of these variables imposed a significant 4.8% change in the R2 value (p = .03) 
increasing the total variance explained for online vulnerability to 28.7%. Of the four anomalies 
identified in the data, only misclassified profiles proved to be significant (b = .07, β = .24, p 
< .05). Network size and age were not significant in Model 3. In sum, H5 received partial 
support. 
3.3 Mediating the Effects of Network Size on Online Vulnerability 
In the following, we report a set of mediation analyses covering H4 and H6. We adopted a 
bootstrapped multiple mediation approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), using PROCESS (Hayes, 
2015), a macro developed for use with SPSS. Such models have been likened to structural 
equation models in that they enable researchers to consider which part of an explanatory 
variable’s effect on a dependent variable can be explained by a mediating variable (Brooks et 
al., 2014). 
H4 stated that effects of network size on vulnerability would be mediated by social and 
structural heterogeneity. The model testing this hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 3. An analysis 
of the 95% BCa confidence intervals (Table 6) of the indirect effects of social ‘friend’ types 
and network clustering indicated that they significantly mediated the association between 
Facebook network size and online vulnerability. Both mediated paths were found to be 
significant in terms of both the traditional Sobel Test (p < .05), associated with the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) causal steps approach to mediation and also via the analysis of the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals generated by the indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Furthermore, 
the completely standardised indirect effect (β = .20, 95% BCa CI [.10, .32]) was indicative of 
a moderate overall effect size for the model. This means that H4 received full support. 
As shown in Figure 3 the indirect effect of social ‘friend’ types was found to have a 
positive association with network size (Path a: β = .03) and a positive association with online 
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vulnerability (Path b: β = .13). These results imply that increased network size increases the 
number of social ‘friend’ types in the network, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
exposure to online vulnerability. The indirect effect of network clustering was found to have a 
negative association with network size (Path a: β = -.01) and a negative association with online 
vulnerability (Path b: β = -1.23). As lower network clustering coefficients are indicative of 
higher network diversity it is appropriate to interpret these results in terms of increases rather 
than decreases. The indirect effects therefore imply that increased network size usage increases 
network diversity via clustering, which in turn increases the likelihood of exposure to online 
vulnerability. 
 Finally, a mediation model was tested to further investigate the hypothesised role of 
network anomalies in the network-vulnerability relationship (H6). The model, fully shown in 
Figure 4, considered potential indirect effects from both the perspective of parallel and serial 
mediators. The analysis of serial multiple moderation effects via the PROCESS macro does 
not produce an indication of significance via the traditional Sobel test. Alternatively an analysis 
of the 95% BCa CI bootstrapped tests is used.  
The confidence intervals for the model (Table 7) indicated that there were some 
significant indirect effects present between the association of network size and online 
vulnerability. The overall model produced a completely standardised indirect effect (β = .29 
95% BCa CI [.16, .44) which was indicative of a moderate overall effect size for the model. 
 In terms of the parallel indirect effects, social ‘friend’ types continued to be a significant 
mediator in the relationship between network size and vulnerability, indicating as before that 
increases in network size increase the number of social ‘friend’ types in the network, which in 
turn increase the likelihood of the ego being exposed to online vulnerability. Misclassified 
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profiles also offered a significant indirect effect, with increases in network size leading to 
increases in misclassified profiles, and in turn an increase in online vulnerability. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of misclassified profiles appeared to render the indirect path 
relationship between network clustering and online vulnerability (Figure 4) non-significant. 
However, the overall indirect effect between network size, network clustering and online 
vulnerability appeared to remain significant in terms of the overall bootstrapped indirect effect 
(Table 7), although the overall effect size was somewhat diminished. This result complimented 
the previous findings of the hierarchical regression analysis in being suggestive of non-person 
profiles playing a potentially mediating role in this relationship. 
The mediating role of non-person profiles on the relationship between network 
clustering and online vulnerability was confirmed via the analysis of the serial indirect effects 
in the model. A significant serial indirect effect was found between network size, network 
clustering, misclassified profiles and online vulnerability. This significant effect was evident 
in both the path relationships (Figure 4) and also the overall bootstrapped effect (Table 7).  
Allowing for the backwards interpretation of network clustering, the indirect effect implies that 
increases in network size lead to an increase in network diversity (due to a decrease in the 
network clustering coefficient). Increases in network diversity then lead to increases in 
misclassified profiles, which in turn result in increased likelihood of the ego being exposed to 
online vulnerability.  
Non-person profiles were not found to have a significant indirect effect on the 
relationship between social ‘friend’ types and online vulnerability. However, when social 
‘friend’ types was considered as a serial mediator with both network clustering and non-person 
profiles it did produce significant indirect effects on the relationship between network size and 
online vulnerability. As such increases in network size appeared to increase the number of 
22 
 
 
 
social ‘friend’ types. Increases in social ‘friend’ types leads to reductions in the network 
clustering coefficient, therefore increasing network diversity. Increases in network diversity 
increase the likelihood of non-person profiles being present in the ego network, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of the ego being exposed to online vulnerability. 
4. Discussion 
The present study explored the impact of social and structural network characteristics on the 
online vulnerability of ego-centric social network site users. Utilising a mixed methods 
approach to online data collection and analysis, the results provide an innovative examination 
of online social networking characteristics. The main findings can be summarised as follows. 
First, consistent with the network size hypothesis (H1), increases in network size were 
indicative of increases in online vulnerability. Second, consistent with the hypotheses that 
social and structural heterogeneity positively predicts online vulnerability (H2 and H3); 
increases in self-reported social diversity and digitally derived network diversity were 
predictive of increases in online vulnerability. Furthermore, social and network diversity 
mediated the relationship between network size and online vulnerability (H4). Third, partial 
support was obtained for the network anomalies hypothesis (H5), that profiles exhibiting non-
standard network characteristics are positively predictive of online vulnerability. 
Misclassified profiles were predictive of increases in online vulnerability, no other non-
standard characteristics were found to be significant predictors. Misclassified profiles also 
provided a mediating role in the relationship between structural characteristics and online 
vulnerability (H6). 
4.1 Network size and social heterogeneity 
The findings revealed that individuals with larger network sizes tended to be more prone to 
experiencing online vulnerability on ego-centric social networking sites, largely due to 
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increases in the social and structural diversity of their networks. One explanation for this is 
contextual collapse. As the number and variety of online contacts increases, the boundaries 
between heterogeneous social spheres collapse (Vitak, 2012), rendering it difficult for the ego 
and their contacts to effectively imagine their target audience when sharing content (Litt, 
2012; Marwick & boyd, 2011). Content intended for a particular ‘imagined’ sphere becomes 
visible across the network, often with little regard for its appropriateness for those outside the 
‘imagined’ sphere. The high visibility of such unmoderated content on ego-centric online 
networks facilitates increases in network tension (Binder et al., 2012) within the network and 
also potential vulnerability of the ego and their contacts, due to the increased risk of exposure 
to potentially contentious and inappropriate material. 
A novel aspect to this perspective is provided by our finding that the different types of 
contacts and the clustering of these contacts were both predictive of vulnerability. Put 
differently, clusters did not align with categorisation of contacts, and both sources of 
information independently help to explain the challenges that arise from the maintenance of 
online networks. Social spheres as clusters may refer to particular life stages (e.g., contacts 
from school days) or to particular environments (e.g., contacts from the office), in which case 
they would still be likely to contain a range of social ties. Conversely, social spheres as 
different categories of others may well be distributed over several clusters (e.g., all closer 
friends, no matter where they are usually encountered). Broadcasting in SNS therefore 
jeopardises the balance within clusters as much as between clusters. Addressing the exact 
composition of clusters in terms of categories of others is beyond the scope of the present 
work, but immediately suggests itself to put our speculations here to the test. 
4.2 Network Anomalies 
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The occurrence of non-standard network profiles rendered mixed results. Misclassified 
profiles were found to significantly predict increases in online vulnerability. A possible 
reason for this is that misclassified profiles represent a diverse array of non-personal entities. 
When an ego connects to a misclassified profile, they share their personal timeline and 
content with the likes of businesses, student/interest groups and possibly fake profiles. Many 
users of ego-centric online social networks knowingly upload and share vast amounts of data 
(Debatin et al., 2009). Misclassified profiles, therefore, gain potential access to the ego’s 
likes, dislikes, location and photographs, presenting the ego with a potential minefield of 
opportunities for data driven online vulnerability such as data misuse and identity theft, 
which may ultimately impact on their psychological, reputational and physical wellbeing.  
Interestingly misclassified profiles were also found to mediate the relationship 
between structural characteristics of network size and diversity and online vulnerability, 
indicating that increases in online vulnerability in large and structurally diverse networks are 
potentially enhanced by the presence of misclassified profiles. In a large, structurally diverse 
network, misclassified profiles may make the imagined audience unimaginable, as the ego is 
presented with the complex task of determining not only ‘who’ but ‘what’ they are sharing 
their content with. 
A more unexpected result was the insignificance of the remaining non-standard 
profile characteristics as predictors of online vulnerability.  Whilst initial correlational 
analysis had rendered a non-significant finding for gender concealment, small but significant 
positive relationships with online vulnerability for both pseudonym use and network outliers 
were found, indicating potential to support the network anomalies hypothesis. However, 
further analysis of the predictive significance of these anomalies provided inconsequential 
results. 
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In the case of pseudonym use and gender-concealment: the predictive non-
significance of these non-standard characteristics calls into question a core argument of the 
‘real-name’ policies currently being mooted by many online social networking sites (Hogan, 
2012). Promoters of the policy claim that such forms of identity concealment might promote 
potentially negative behaviours on a network and therefore increase the online vulnerability 
of wider network users (Cho et al., 2012; Hogan, 2012). The results of this study imply that 
individuals adopting such non-standard characteristics may not necessarily be ill-intentioned 
and may in some cases merely exercising their right to express their identity online in a 
manner unbound by the potential risks and restrictions of non-anonymised data exchange. 
The insignificant predictive association between network outliers and online 
vulnerability was also unexpected. Prior research had suggested that unconnected individuals 
in a network might increase tension and vulnerability due to the low social and reputational 
costs of their potential exchanges online (Brass et al., 1998). Whilst correlational analysis did 
provide minor evidence for this theoretical standpoint, the lack of predictive significance 
suggested that network outliers might not necessarily constitute online vulnerability in all 
networks.   
The mixed results rendered by the network anomalies indicate that further research is 
required in order to determine the role that such entities have within an ego-centric online 
social network. Ego-centric online social networks have amassed global participation 
numbering in the billions. In contrast, the present study provides a cross-sectional snapshot of 
only 177 users. With this in mind further large scale, longitudinal analysis is recommended. 
To conclude, this present study provides significant support for the relationship 
between social and structural network characteristics and online vulnerability. In doing so, it 
increases our understanding of the potential detrimental effects of the contextual collapse of 
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social spheres on online networks by adding digitally derived information to the largely self-
report based theoretical standpoints of previous social network literature (Binder et al., 2012; 
Vitak, 2012). Furthermore, the study provides an indication of the potential for vulnerability 
that may be brought via connecting to certain types of anomalous and potentially nefarious 
network contacts. These findings carry implications for those designing SNS and applications 
integrated with SNS technology. To the extent that an automated recognition of types of 
contacts can be improved (Eagle, Pentland, & Lazer, 2009) and pseudonyms can be more 
reliably detected, a combination of indicators of social heterogeneity and non-standard 
profiles could be used to identify vulnerable users with the aim of offering them software 
settings and advice to better protect them. Closely related to such interventions is the 
emergent and pervasive problem of maintaining any substantial level of data privacy on 
social media. As a continuous flow of news headlines suggest, the breakdown of online 
privacy has, in some cases, severe implication for individual wellbeing. In a world that 
experiences a marked shift towards everyday online experiences and the use of virtual social 
spaces, experts and the general public need models that guide us in making these experiences 
and spaces psychologically safe and sound. 
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Footnotes 
1 Untransformed regressions were run as a comparison. Comparable findings for the first two 
models were evident, although the magnitude of effect sizes was slightly reduced. For model 
3 the introduction of the heavily skewed pseudonym and outlier data had a substantial impact 
on the results overall. This provided support for the use of transformed data in the models. 
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Table 1 
General Sample Characteristics. 
 Frequency % 
Gender    
Male 65 36.7 
Female 112 63.3 
Daily Facebook Engagement   
0-15 minutes 51 28.8 
16-30 minutes 45 25.4 
31-45 minutes 29 16.4 
46-60 minutes 22 12.4 
1 hour + 30 16.9 
Facebook Privacy   
Don’t Know 9 5.1 
Anyone 11 6.2 
Friends Only 118 66.7 
Friends + Additional Filters 39 22.0 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of self-report and digitally derived measures. 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Online Vulnerability 2.75  1.09 1.00 5.00 
Network Size 399.40  277.25 4.00 1468.00 
Network Clustering .77  .06 .36 1.00 
Social ‘Friend’ Types 9.11 2.61 1.00 16.00 
Misclassified Profiles 3.18 4.36 .00 27.00 
Gender-Hidden 
Profiles 
2.40 3.09 .00 21.00 
Pseudonym Profiles 2.49 5.41 .00 57.00 
Network Outliers 8.86 11.69 .00 90.00 
Age 22.85 9.81 13 77 
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Table 3 
Frequency of social ‘friend’ types reported by the sample (N=177). 
Social ‘Friend’ Type N (%) 
Parents 111 (62.7%) 
Siblings 137 (77.4%) 
Grandparents 44 (24.9%) 
Other Family 149 (84.2%) 
Best Friend 165 (93.2%) 
Friends 175 (98.9%) 
Current Classmate  138 (78.0%) 
Previous Classmate 152 (85.9%) 
Current Teacher/Lecturer 13 (7.3%) 
Previous Teacher/Lecturer 54 (30.5%) 
Neighbour 50 (28.2%) 
Leisure / Interest Group Member 110 (62.1%) 
Friend of Friend (FoF) 111 (62.7%) 
Casual Acquaintance 109 (61.6%) 
Online Only 50 (28.2%) 
Celebrities / Public Figures 45 (25.4%) 
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Table 4 
Bivariate Correlations. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Online 
Vulnerability 
 .383** -.260** .370** .394** .201** -.033 .166* -.104 .143 
2. Network Size   -.506** .430** .627** .460** .271** .377** -.139 .165* 
3. Network Clustering    -.349** -.529** -.441** -.421** -.716** -.370** -.308** 
4. Social ‘friend’ 
types 
    .339** .326** .135 .305** -.006 .268** 
5. Misclassified      .516** .265** .494** .081 .213** 
6. Pseudonym       .331** .408** .077 .035 
7. Gender-hidden        .482** .543** .135 
8. Network outliers         .488** .339** 
9. Age          .241** 
10. Gender           
Note: df =175. *p<.05. **p<.001. 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical regression analysis. 
 DV: Online vulnerability 
 Model 1: Size Model 2: Diversity Model 3: Anomalies 
Demographics    
Age -.049 [-.099, -.003]* -.069 [-.126, -.024]* -.034 [-.101, .034] 
Gender .074 [-.019, .175] .028 [-.064, .125] .006 [-.101, .034] 
Network Variables    
Network size .017 [.010, .024]*** .007 [-.002, .016] .006 [-.005, .017] 
Network 
clustering 
 -1.229 [-2.125, 
-.325]* 
-1.112 [-2.190, 
-.078]* 
Social ‘friend’ 
types 
 .132 [.002, .257]* .146 [.025, .262]* 
Network 
Anomalies 
   
Misclassified   .069 [.012, .124]* 
Gender-hidden   -.055 [1.115, .001] 
Pseudonym   -.038 [-.081, .019] 
Outliers   .001 [-.042, .039] 
    
Constant 1.487 [1.163, 
1.820]*** 
2.355 [1.172, 
3.595]*** 
2.097 [.875, 3.376]** 
 F(3, 176)=12.425*** F(5, 176)=10.733*** F(9, 176)=7.451*** 
R2 .177 .239 .287 
Note: *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. All coefficients are unstandardised.  
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Table 6 
Analysis of indirect effects (Paths a x b) for Model 1. 
 
Unstandardised 
Point Estimate 
 
Product of 
Coefficients 
 
p 
Bootstrapping* 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 
 SE Z Lower Upper 
Social ‘friend’ 
types 
.004 .078 .002 2.087 .037 .001 .008 
Network 
clustering 
.006 .123 .003 2.269 .023 .002 .012 
Note: *Bootstrapping based on 5000 samples. 
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Table 7   
Analysis of indirect effects (Paths a x b( x d)) for Model 2.  
Indirect Path 
Unstandardised 
Effect 
 
 Bootstrapping* 
Standardised 
Effect 
 
Boot SE 
Bias Corrected 
95% CI 
 Lower Upper 
1. SizeFriendsVulnerability .0039 .078 .0018 .0006 .0079 
 
2.SizeFriendsClusterVulnerability .0007 .015 .0005 .0001 .0021 
 
3. SizeFriendsMisc. Vulnerability .0000 -.000 .0004 -.0008 .0007 
 
4.SizeFriendsClusterMisc.Vuln
. 
.0003 .005 .0002 .0001 .0008 
 
5. SizeClusterVulnerability .0038 .076 .0021 .0001 .0086 
 
6.SizeClusterMisc. Vulnerability .0014 .027 .0008 .0002 .0034 
 
7. SizeMisclassifiedVulnerability .0045 .089 .0021 .0007 .0088 
 
Note: *Bootstrapping based on 5000 samples. Misc. = Misclassified Profiles. Vuln. = Vulnerability. 
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Fig. 1. Facebook network with 269 ‘friends’ and a global clustering of .747. Network Key: red = female; blue = male; black = no gender. Straight 
lines represent interconnections among ego’s Facebook “friends”. Curved connections represent multiple, collapsed interconnections among 
network clusters. 
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Fig. 2. Facebook network with 235 ‘friends’ and a global clustering of .391. Network Key: red = female; blue = male; black = no gender; solid 
sphere = typical ‘friend’; square = misclassified profile; triangle = pseudonym profile. Straight lines represent interconnections among ego’s 
Facebook “friends”. Curved connections represent multiple, collapsed interconnections among network clusters. 
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Fig. 3. Path representation of mediation and effects for Model. Note: *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. β values represent unstandardised 
coefficients. 
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Fig. 4. Path representation of mediation and effects for Model 2. Note: *p<.05. **p<.01. *** p<.001. β values represent unstandardised 
coefficients. 
 
 
